Volume 3 (2016)

I. Special Issue: Political Institution and Political behavior

Political institutions effect political outcomes through constraining behaviors of political actors. As such, political institutions are designed to achieve specific political goals. Nonetheless, changing political institutions does not necessarily produce political outcomes that are expected by designers because, in some cases, some parts of the institutions are not rationally designed so as to achieve the goal and/or because, in other cases, political actors behave in ways contrary to the designers’ expectation. Additionally, the relationship between political institutions and political outcomes depends on the behavior of the electorates through their rational choice. Thus, the relationship becomes more complicated when voting behavior of the electorate intervenes than when the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats are directly constrained by the institutions. In this special issue, we will reveal that the voting behaviors and the result of elections produce political outcomes unexpected by institutional design. In so doing, this issue includes papers focusing on party system, electoral competitions, and budget-making processes.

NISHIKAWA Shin-ichi, Meiji University
Editorial Board:
Ken ENDO, Hokkaido University
Yuko KASUYA, Keio University
Nobutake OTOBE, Ibaraki University

Table of Contents

After Populism?: The Long and Winding Road to the Westminster Model
Masahiro YAMADA

DOI: 10.15545/3.1

Does a Mixed-Member Majoritarian System Lead to a Party Vote?: The Decision of Japanese Voters in the 2012 and 2014 General Elections

DOI: 10.15545/3.15

The (In)Significant Role of the Legislature in the Budgetary Process

DOI: 10.15545/3.29

II. Articles

Understanding the Paradox of Not Running: Evidence from the Business Cycle and the Entry of Third-Party Candidates in the U.S. State-Level Elections
Yasushi ASAKO and Tetsuya MATSUBAYASHI

DOI: 10.15545/3.43

The Instability of Producer Cartels in Japan: Working Toward a Substantive Understanding of Special-Interest Politics in the Context of General-Interest Reform
FUKAYA Takeshi

DOI: 10.15545/3.67

Opportunistic Violation in Crisis: A Test of Alliance Termination

DOI: 10.15545/3.101

Impact of Bicameralism on the Disproportionality of Cabinet Portfolio Allocation
Hiroki KUBO

DOI: 10.15545/3.127