I. Special Issue: Political Institution and Political behavior
Political institutions effect political outcomes through constraining behaviors of political actors. As such, political institutions are designed to achieve specific political goals. Nonetheless, changing political institutions does not necessarily produce political outcomes that are expected by designers because, in some cases, some parts of the institutions are not rationally designed so as to achieve the goal and/or because, in other cases, political actors behave in ways contrary to the designers’ expectation. Additionally, the relationship between political institutions and political outcomes depends on the behavior of the electorates through their rational choice. Thus, the relationship becomes more complicated when voting behavior of the electorate intervenes than when the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats are directly constrained by the institutions. In this special issue, we will reveal that the voting behaviors and the result of elections produce political outcomes unexpected by institutional design. In so doing, this issue includes papers focusing on party system, electoral competitions, and budget-making processes.
|Editor-in-chief||:||NISHIKAWA Shin-ichi, Meiji University|
|Editorial Board||:||Ken ENDO, Hokkaido University
Yuko KASUYA, Keio University
Nobutake OTOBE, Ibaraki University
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