When deliberative democratic theory considers grassroots civic participation, its main concern has been designed civic forums sometimes called “mini-publics.” However, this article contends that both social movements and the intimate sphere also matter when we consider grassroots participation in deliberative democracy. With reference to the recently elaborated idea of deliberative systems, this article first argues that social movements and the intimate sphere can be examined as parts of a deliberative system as a whole in terms of the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative actions, and second, that each of them should be understood as a deliberative system in itself because both of them can create decision-making. Finally, this article proposes the idea of “nested deliberative systems” in order to indicate that a unit is at the same time both a part of a macro deliberative system and a deliberative system in itself.

**Keywords:** deliberative democracy, deliberative system, social movement, the intimate sphere

Tetsuki Tamura is a Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Nagoya University (tamura@law.nagoya-u.ac.jp). His research interests include deliberative democracy, basic income and the welfare state, and feminist political theory. The author would like to thank John S. Dryzek and David Green for their assistance. This article has benefitted from the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (24530132) by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Grassroots civic participation is one of the most important topics in the study of deliberative democracy. Examinations of grassroots civic participation have often focused on “mini-publics” (Fung 2007; Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Shinohara (ed.) 2012), which are types of designed forums where ordinary citizens can meet and talk together. Scholars interested in the subject have approached these mini-publics both empirically and theoretically as examples of the institutionalization of deliberative democracy (Dryzek and Hendriks 2012; Fung and Wright 2003; Smith 2009).

However, mini-publics are not the only form of grassroots deliberation. Other types of grassroots participation may also be envisaged in terms of deliberative democracy. This article focuses on two: social movements and the intimate sphere. I argue that both can be examined as repertories of grassroots deliberative democracy. My argument is twofold. On the one hand, these two concepts can be examined in terms of deliberative democratic theory with reference to the idea of deliberative systems, which have recently been discussed by scholars interested in deliberative democracy. My argument goes further, however, to contend that more serious consideration of the actions performed within social movements and the intimate sphere requires that we rethink the concept of the deliberative system itself. I argue that not only are social movements and the intimate sphere part of the deliberative system as a whole, but also that each is a deliberative system by itself. Finally, I propose that deliberative systems should be reconceptualized as having a nested structure in which each site is not only a part of the macro-deliberative system, but also a micro-deliberative system by itself where binding, collective decision-making is produced.

In Section 1, I shall present an overview of the concept of deliberative systems. In the next section, I address the question of how to examine both social movements and intimate spheres in terms of deliberative systems, with a particular focus on the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative action. Finally, in Section 3, I argue that taking “everyday

1. Scholars have different opinions about what kinds of institutions should be included in mini-publics. While Archon Fung (2007) includes forums open to all citizens such as participatory budgeting, other scholars distinguish them from bodies that use random sampling and apply the concept of mini-publics only to the latter (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Shinohara 2012; Smith 2009).

2. Tamura (2013) is an earlier consideration in this regard, but it deals with only the intimate sphere.
talk” more seriously would contribute to a restructuring of the concept of deliberative systems.

A Systemic Turn in Deliberative Democratic Theory

Recently, a “systemic” approach has gained prominence in deliberative democratic theory. Jane Mansbridge (1999) pioneered this idea when she introduced the concept of deliberative systems in order to understand deliberative democracy in terms of connectedness, from the “everyday talk” of family members to debates in courts and other governmental institutions. Other scholars to contribute to the elaboration of this concept include Parkinson (2006), Hendriks (2006), Goodin (2008), Dryzek (2010), and Mansbridge et al. (2012). The focus, again, is not on a particular institution or process, but rather on their connectedness and interaction. According to Mansbridge et al., a “system” means “a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts” (2012, 4). It is often assumed that each part of a system has a distributed function, a division of labor, and parts that are connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. A system requires not only a division of labor but also “some relational interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring about changes in some others” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 4). In a systemic approach, each single deliberative forum is a part of a whole system (Dryzek 2010, 7).

Why does the concept of deliberative systems matter? Three reasons may be given. First, it enables us to identify various sites as deliberative—not only assemblies and mini-publics, but also other spaces like cafes, classrooms, bars, public squares, and “private” spheres such as family and

3. Some conceptual problems remain that are not addressed in this article. One of them is the clarification of the difference between similar terms. David Owen and Graham Smith point out that Mansbridge et al. (2012) are unclear about the different uses of the terms “deliberative system,” “deliberative systems,” and “deliberative sub-systems” (Owen and Smith 2013). I also indicate that the difference between system and systemic should be considered. Is there a difference between using the word system and applying a systemic approach? When using the word “system,” a spatial unit such as a polity, which has a clear boundary, seems to be assumed. In contrast, when we talk about a systemic approach this is not necessarily presumed. What is needed is consideration of the relationship between different sites and actions. How should we think about this difference? Should we look for any potentially significant theoretical implications deriving from this difference? While addressing these questions goes beyond the scope of this article, they should be considered seriously in order to elaborate the concept of deliberative systems.
friendships could also be considered locations of deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2010, 11), although each site would have different modes of communication. The study of deliberative democracy has greatly developed through studies on mini-publics during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This has helped empirical research on deliberative democracy develop what is called an “institutional turn” or “empirical turn” (Dryzek 2010, 6–9). However, Simone Chambers criticizes the exclusivity of the “institutional turn,” claiming it has lost sight of the aspect of “mass democracy” in deliberative democracy and may lead scholars to the view that only the few people attending institutional civic forums actually engage in deliberation. As a result, she says, deliberative democratic theory abandons its concern in “mass” democracy (Chambers 2009; see also Chambers 2012). While her criticism could be seen as problematic (cf. Dryzek 2010, 6–7), there certainly is a risk of deliberative democracy losing sight of the significance of various actors and activities that are seemingly incongruent with mini-publics. For example, if mini-publics with random sampling are regarded as the deliberative democratic institution, it could be difficult for deliberative democratic theory to include interest advocacies and social movements in consideration (Hendriks 2006). Yet if we use the concept of a deliberative system, it becomes possible to consider such activities in terms of deliberative democracy because this concept includes connections and interactions between different sites and actions. It is worth noting that Mansbridge’s original paper on deliberative systems considers even everyday talk between a wife and husband as an element of a deliberative system (Mansbridge 1999). Of course, some theorists, like Jürgen Habermas and John Dryzek, have directed their attention to the role of the broader public sphere, including not only formal institutions but also secondary associations and social movements (Cohen 2009; Dryzek 2000; Habermas 1992).

Second, this concept of deliberative systems makes it possible to deal with institutions and practices which are seemingly non-deliberative in terms of the deliberative democratic perspective; i.e. individually non-

4. The private or intimate sphere has received limited attention in deliberative democratic theory; see Conover et al. (2002); Mansbridge (1999; 2007); Tamura (2010b; 2011a). Even Dryzek, who has closely studied the significance of deliberative (discursive) democracy in informal public spheres, including social movements, has not discussed private spheres. However, in a recently published book (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 27–29), he and his coauthor clearly recognize the significance of the private sphere and include it as one of the seven components of a deliberative system.
deliberative forms of action like expert statements, pressure, protests, or media might enhance the whole deliberative system (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 13–22). The concept of deliberative systems recognizes different modes, criteria, and functions of different sites and activities. Mansbridge and her coauthors argue that while three functions—*epistemic, ethical, and democratic*—are necessary to promote the goals of the system, all of these functions are not necessarily fully realized in all parts (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 10–13). Hence, some part of the system might realize the epistemic function but not the ethical and democratic functions at the same time, while another part might realize the latter two, but not the first. Interest advocacy, for instance, might not satisfy the ethical function, but might help increase the quality of the whole system by fulfilling the democratic function. Some may wonder if this way of conceptualizing is stretching the concept beyond the original notion of deliberative democracy. Yet if we see inducing reflection without coercion as one of the key conditions of deliberation, it is possible to avoid this problem because we can expect each part of a deliberative system to contribute to inducing reflection upon a macro system.

Finally, the idea of deliberative systems can contribute to reconsidering the relationship between liberal democracy and deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2010; Tamura 2013). While deliberative democracy has been considered a complementary idea to liberal democracy (cf. Habermas 1992), it is possible to understand liberal democracy as one type among various deliberative systems. Obviously, scholars interested in the idea of deliberative systems have not necessarily attempted to rethink the relation between liberal and deliberative democracy. Dryzek is an exception: he contends that the existing treatments of deliberative systems by other scholars are still tied to “the institutional specifics of developed liberal democratic state” and argues that “the basic notion of a deliberative system can actually be generalized to any kind of political setting” (Dryzek 2010, 8). Dryzek offers a more generic idea of a deliberative system in

5. See Steiner (2008) on the problem of concept stretching in the case of deliberation, although his focus is on the (non-) distinction between deliberation and strategic bargaining in empirical research.

6. Dryzek regards “inducing reflection on preferences in non-coercive fashion” (Dryzek 2000, 76) as one of the key conditions in deliberation. Mansbridge et al. (2010, 65) also adopt a revised version of Dryzek’s definition. Tamura (2010a) also argues that inducing reflection is most important when we consider deliberation, whether it is based on reason or emotion.
his coauthored book with Stevenson that consists of the following seven components: private sphere, public space, empowered space, transmission, accountability, meta-deliberation, and decisiveness (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 27–29). Representation under a competitive party system is an empowered space in the liberal democratic deliberative system. Yet other deliberative systems might have other empowered spaces, which might not have a competitive party system. While Dryzek’s idea is important and should be considered further when rethinking the relation between liberal democracy and deliberative democracy, another aspect regarding this third point is more significant for this article: the problem of the public/private distinction of modern liberal democracy. I argue, as previously stated, that the idea of deliberative systems can contribute to rethinking this public/private dichotomy through finding and locating actions within the “private” sphere (Tamura 2013, 147–51). This is originally a theoretical contribution by Mansbridge (Mansbridge 1999). However, in the following sections, I scrutinize her work on “everyday talk” and will argue that her understanding of deliberative systems is still insufficient.

**Social Movements and the Intimate Sphere in Deliberative Systems: The Macro-Deliberative Effect of Micro-Non-deliberative Actions**

In this section, referring to both social movements and the intimate sphere, I examine the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative actions. Each part of a deliberative system can be seen in terms of connectedness, either to the other parts, or to the entire macro system. Mansbridge and her coauthors state that “a single part, which in itself may have low or even negative deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, may nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 3). The point here is that it is possible to consider non-deliberative practice in each micro site in terms of its macro-deliberative effect. Therefore, my focus is on the non-deliberative aspects of both social movements and the intimate sphere and the macro-deliberative effects of these aspects. The deliberative democratic aspect in each micro site is also important but it will be explored in the next section.

**Social Movements**

Sometimes protest movements are seen to be non-deliberative because while deliberative democracy requires the transformation of preferences and opinions, protest movements seek to realize their own determined aim and/or ideal without any transformation. Their way of communication
is based not on the reason or rationality that is often supposed to be deliberative, but rather on either strategic calculation of purposes and means or strong emotional feeling. As a result, we do not find the transformation of preference, but its maintenance and reinforcement. Mutz (2006) typically argues that on the one hand, there is tension between deliberation and “hearing the other side,” and on the other, participation and “realizing our own opinions.”

An important issue is whether or not protest movements are deliberative. However, we can consider the macro-deliberative effect of protest movements even if they are not deliberative from the systemic perspective. Mansbridge and her coauthors accept that protest movements sometimes include anti-deliberative behaviors such as exercising coercion, using slogans to evoke enthusiasm and contestation, and reducing mutual respect. Nevertheless, protest movements contribute to the macro-deliberative system as “a remedial force introduced to correct or publicize a failure or weakness in fulfilling any or all of its key functions” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 18). Protest movements can bear each of the three functions one expects to find in a deliberative system. First, an epistemic function: protest can facilitate and promote the “circulation of useful information.” Second, an ethical function: protest can facilitate and promote “ethically respectful interactions among citizens.” And third, a democratic function: protest can correct “inequalities in access to influence by bringing more voices and interests into decision-making processes” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 18–19).

It would seem relatively easy to understand some protest movements, such as new social movements, through a systemic approach. “New social movements” is a general term for the various social movements that emerged between the 1960s and 1980s and differed from the working class labor movement. Indeed, Claus Offe argues that new social movements have contributed to increasing the learning ability of whole social systems by decreasing the degree of blindness and unconsciousness in them (Offe 1984, 294). His insights on new social movements closely resemble the systemic approach to deliberative democracy.

Yet, three points need to be considered when applying systemic ideas to protest movements. First, care is needed when dealing with the characteristics of protest movements. Even if some protest movements seem to include anti-deliberative behavior, we have to ask ourselves whether this kind of observation might come from our own theoretical presumptions. Upon closer examination, protest movements may actually turn out to have a deliberative democratic organization. This point is considered in the next section.
The second point is that it is also possible to rethink modes of communication used by protest movements in a broader sense than in ordinary authentic deliberative democratic theory, but still in terms of deliberation. This is what I would like to investigate here. As noted previously, a systemic approach argues the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative practices.

However, it is worth noting that at the same time, a systemic approach argues also for the deliberative character of what usually seems to be non-deliberative. Of course, nowadays it is well-known that some theorists have tried to broaden the range of modes of communication considered in deliberative democracy. For instance, Iris M. Young maintains that not only argumentation but also other communication modes, like greetings, rhetoric, and storytelling, should be recognized as significant modes in deliberative (or communicative) democracy (Young 1996). Dryzek also emphasizes the important role of rhetoric in his notion of discursive democracy (Dryzek 2000). Recently, he elaborated on the concept of rhetoric and connected it with the systemic approach (Dryzek 2010, chapter 4). Building upon Robert Putnam’s distinction on social capital, Dryzek distinguishes two types of rhetoric: “bonding” and “bridging.” His primary concern is bridging rhetoric because it can connect different people in different groups. Sometimes even divided people are able to strengthen protests by establishing a broader coalition that can lead to greater social reform, such as the civil rights movement in the United States and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. At the same time, Dryzek does not deny the role of “bonding” rhetoric. Both Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela successfully used “bridging” rhetoric to change people’s preferences without any coercion. Chambers also suggests the idea of “deliberative rhetoric,” which induces “deliberation in the sense of inducing considered reflection about a future action” among ordinary citizens. As deliberative rhetoric is still “rhetoric,” it is embodied in “an essentially asymmetrical relationship between speaker and hearer” (Chambers 2009, 335). Nevertheless, Chambers supports this type of “monological” speech in order to reconcile “mass” democracy with deliberative democracy (Chambers 2009, 334).

The third point is to distinguish the movements that are supposed to have macro-deliberative effects from other movements which do not have them. For instance, how should we think about extreme right-wing social movements that advocate exclusive and discriminative claims based on racism and sexism? Do these movements also have some macro-deliberative effect? Mansbridge and her coauthors acknowledge that they do. They refer to the “Radical Left” and the “Tea Party” in the following:
Concretely, certain disruptive and only weakly civil Radical Left or Tea Party protests enhance the deliberative system if they can be reasonably understood as giving voice to a minority opinion long ignored in the public sphere, or as bringing more and better important information into the public arena. (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 19)

Even “disruptive and only weakly civil” protests can contribute to enhancing the deliberative system if they are seen to give “voice to a minority opinion long ignored in the public sphere.” Yet they also note that:

[T]hese benefits were outweighed by the partisan and aggressive tenor of many of the public protests and disruptions, a context that creates a toxic atmosphere for deliberation and thus is not system enhancing over time. (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 19)

Therefore, the problem is again which kind of protest should be accepted as non-“toxic” for the deliberative system. Are there any criteria to distinguish non-deliberative but macro-effective protests from non-effective ones?

One way to differentiate between protest movements is to take into account the distinction of using/refraining from violence or coercion. At first glance, it seems apparent that a protest having a macro-deliberative effect should not be violent or coercive. Deliberative democratic theories sometimes refer to non-coerciveness as a criterion of deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2000). While I recognize non-coerciveness should be one of the criteria for good deliberation, the problem remains because the issue here is not the criteria for deliberation itself but those for non-deliberative yet macro-effective action. In considering this, we need to be sensitive to the fact that even verbal communication may sometimes have the same effect as physical violence; for instance, “domestic violence” includes not only physical violence itself but also the violent effects of verbal abuse. Indeed, some movements with extremely exclusivist claims sometimes use slogans whose effect is comparable to physical violence. Hence, it is not self-evident that the criterion of the presence/non-presence of violence should be applied to evaluate the macro-effectiveness of non-deliberative movements.

Some might advocate that what is needed is not democracy but the rule of law in order to regulate “illegal” claims. However, what constitutes an “illegal” claim is still not self-evident. In other words, among people having different beliefs it is difficult to reach agreement on which claims are illegal. Furthermore, because it lacks the process of consensus building, resolution through a judiciary might result in the maintenance of sharp differences among people with different opinions. While a judiciary might
make a *just* decision, this does not necessarily mean it is also a *legitimate* decision, which should be based on agreement among different, sometimes deeply divided people.\(^7\) Democracy matters when we consider the problem of legitimacy seriously. Therefore, I prefer to be consistent in analyzing the problem in terms of democracy. One of the reasons why democracy matters is its capacity to bring reflexivity. Jack Knight and James Johnson contend that democracy is far superior to other arrangements, such as the market and jurisprudence, because it enables people to reconsider and revise the conditions of ongoing interactions (Knight and Johnson 2007, 56). This is especially relevant to deliberative democracy since it is capable of inducing reflection on the whole system as well as the individual (Dryzek 2000; Tamura 2010a). Indeed, Dryzek (2010, 12) mentions “meta-deliberation” as one of the necessary characteristics of a deliberative system. Meta-deliberation is “a capacity for self-examination and self-transformation” of the system. It is especially important because, as Dryzek notes:

\[
\text{[I]t captures the reflexive capacity of a system to deliberate its own shortcomings and consequently deepen its own deliberative and democratic capacities with time.} \quad \text{(Dryzek 2010, 138)}
\]

Therefore, it could be said that relying on a systemic approach would make it possible to distinguish protests having a macro-deliberative effect from others, because then we can suppose that the system operates with meta-deliberation.\(^8\)

**THE INTIMATE SPHERE**

The intimate sphere is a space consisting of people who are in some kind of intimate relationship: family, love, friendship.\(^9\) How do we deal with the

\(^7\) Kazuo Seiyama (2006, 342) points out the problem of the creation of new rules through judicial decision. As this kind of decision is created at the legislative level without political deliberation where people on both sides are represented, those who oppose the decision might not accept it. Jeremy Waldron (1999) argues the significance of legislation in cases where the acceptance of the decision is required despite disagreement among people.

\(^8\) I have paid partial attention to the problem of the micro-macro relationship in deliberative systems. For instance, could a macro-deliberative system be deliberative even if every part of it is non-deliberative? It seems that even if some parts are non-deliberative a deliberative system should have other parts which are deliberative in themselves. See Owen and Smith (2013) for detailed arguments.

\(^9\) The concept of the intimate sphere is sometimes differentiated from the family (cf. Roseneil and Budgeon 2004; Saito 2000). In this article I use both terms interchangeably and understand “family” as one type of intimate sphere.
intimate sphere in terms of deliberative systems? There are two types of relationships in the intimate sphere and democracy: democracy from the intimate sphere and democracy over the intimate sphere (Tamura 2010). The former focuses on the process of democracy where interests, claims, and issues emerging from the intimate sphere are articulated and transmitted to an external decision-making process. The latter means that issues related to, and usually confined to, the intimate sphere itself are discussed and finally decided upon by its members. For example, democracy over the intimate sphere emerges when a wife and her husband discuss and make decisions on how to share childcare responsibilities. In the next section, I address democracy from the intimate sphere and deal with democracy over the intimate sphere in the context of rethinking the concept of deliberative systems.

Here I will systemically consider democracy from the intimate sphere. The main question is what we can say about democracy from the intimate sphere concerning the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative action. This question is important because what is usually meant when scholars talk about democracy from the intimate sphere is the relationship of micro-deliberative action to macro settings. Based on focus group surveys, Conover and her coauthors argue that “frequent private discussion appears to be a necessary precondition for public discussion” (Conover et al. 2002, 37). They emphasize the significance of micro everyday talk, as it contributes to activating public discussion at the macro level. Their analysis certainly seems to be a result of systemic consideration. However, its focus is not on the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative action. Another example is Mansbridge’s own argument on decision-making in a deliberative system. She argues that micro everyday talk might have an effect on changing “the authoritative allocation of values” in the society (Easton, quoted in Mansbridge 2007). In her more recent works, she talks about the concept of “societal decision.” She contends that “informal discussion can contribute to an eventual state decision and to broad societal decisions” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 8-9). I wonder whether Mansbridge considers decisions whose scope is limited to the intimate sphere also to be “societal” decisions. Her attention seems to be focused only on democracy from the intimate sphere, not democracy over the intimate sphere. However, this is a point considered in the next section. What needs to be recognized here is that Mansbridge talks about the macro-deliberative effect of micro-deliberative action.

10 Indeed, Conover and her coauthors refer to the concept of deliberative systems (Conover and Searing 2005).
Again, what kind of macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative action should we think about in the case of democracy from the intimate sphere? First, let me cite an example of “everyday activism” by Mansbridge. Everyday activism “occurs when a non-activist takes an action in order to change others’ actions or beliefs on an issue that the public ought to discuss” (Mansbridge 1999, 217). This was confirmed by a woman in a focus group. When her husband asked her, “You gonna fix my plate?” at a big family dinner with her in-laws, she replied “I don’t fix your plate at home. Why would I do it here?” According to this woman, her statement contributed to “liberating the other women” in the family because they suddenly stopped serving plates to their husbands. Mansbridge says that:

> With this small act—a combination of speech and, in this case, nonperformance of an expected action—the non-activist intervened in her own and others’ lives to promote a relatively new ideal of gender justice, exemplified by her verb “liberating.” She intended to affect the others by her actions and words. She undoubtedly also believed that the issues on which she acted were issues that the public ought to discuss. (Mansbridge 1999, 218)

I believe it is possible to understand this case as an example of the macro-deliberative effect of micro-non-deliberative action because it seems to me that the woman was strong-willed and would not change her mind regardless of her husband’s reaction. This is the reason why Mansbridge uses the word “activism” for this case. The woman’s action is surely a kind of activism in everyday life, although she is not an activist per se. The only remaining problem in this case is that it is still uncertain whether her “everyday activism” had some effect beyond the people who attended the dinner. The influence of her action might be limited to the intimate sphere, which would mean that this case is probably not about democracy from the intimate sphere but rather democracy over the intimate sphere. Of course, I have no intention to insist that, when the scope of the influence is limited to within the intimate sphere, cases do not matter. Rather, my point here is that the intimate sphere should be recognized in itself as a deliberative system because of democracy over the intimate sphere, even if the influence of democracy from the intimate sphere does not reach the macro system.

**Toward Nested Deliberative Systems**

Finally, I would like to address the question of whether some points in the concept of deliberative systems should be reconsidered. While my concern in the former section was on the problem of intermediation between each element of a deliberative system and the whole system, it is worth asking
whether this is the only problem when we consider deliberative systems in terms of both social movements and the intimate sphere. These two cases prompt us to further considerations. First, both social movements and the intimate sphere are understood not only as elements of a macro-deliberative system, but also as deliberative systems. Second, therefore, deliberative systems should be reconceptualized as having a nested structure, in which a site is regarded both as an element of an upper deliberative system and as a deliberative system in itself.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE INTIMATE SPHERE AS DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS

Each social movement and the intimate sphere is a deliberative system in itself, although political scientists usually regard the state or government as the only place where binding, collective decision-making is produced. Whether their concern is with the local or the supranational, many scholars suppose that binding, collective decision-making or “the authoritative allocation of values” (Easton 1953, 129) is a function of the government only. However, this presumption is not self-evident. It is possible to recast sites of binding, collective decision-making as being more multiple and plural. For instance, participatory democratic theories in the 1960s and 1980s focused on workplace and/or industrial democracy (Dahl 1985; Macpherson 1977; Pateman 1970). Why can we not find other places as units of binding, collective decision-making? I contend that we should add social movements and the intimate sphere as places where binding, collective decision-making is produced. Specifically, I suggest a normative view that such binding, collective decision-making should be produced through deliberation.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

While social movements were considered to be non-deliberative action in the previous section, it is also possible to understand them as deliberative systems where opinions can be formed and decisions can be made. Indeed, studies of social movements have recently been concerned with democracy within social movements themselves.11 Here, social movements are considered to be arenas for discussion and investigated not in terms of

11. Note the continuing attention to the role of social movements by a radical democratic camp among deliberative democratic theorists (Dryzek 2000; 2006; Young 2003). However, our focus here is on social movements as an arena of discussion by its members and, therefore, as a deliberative system. See more on the distinction between liberal, civic republican, and the radical democratic camp in deliberative democratic theory, in Talisse (2012).
their protest aspects but of their meetings (DELLA PORTA and RUCHT 2013, 2). Focusing on global justice movements (GJMs), Donatella Della Porta examines the extent to which deliberative democracy works inside movements.\textsuperscript{12} GJMs are characterized in their plurality, multiplicity, and are heterogeneousness, which is why democracy is found within them. In Della Porta’s words:

\begin{quote}
Internal democracy is particularly relevant for a multifaceted, heterogeneous movement … that incorporates many social, generational, and ideological groups. (DELLA PORTA 2005, 338)
\end{quote}

Of course, the point is not democracy in general, but the kind of democracy, that is to be found in social movements. Della Porta analyzed the fundamental documents of 244 social movement organizations that have participated in the Social Forum process in Europe and, based on these, offered a typology of the conception of internal democracy in social movements. Using the two axes of the level of participation (high/low) and the level of orientation toward consensus (high/low), she suggested four models of internal democracy: an associational model (low participation and low consensus), deliberative representation (low participation and high consensus), an assemblary model (high participation and low consensus), and deliberative participation (high participation and high consensus). In practice, the most common model is the associational model (35.6 percent), followed by deliberative representation (32.7 percent). However, the\textit{ normative} preference of movements is different from reality; the first is deliberative participation (36.7 percent) and the second is an assemblary model (35.9 percent) (DELLA PORTA 2013, 73; see also ŌGAWA 2011). Della Porta tried to show that “participation and deliberation were considered, therefore, as main values for ‘another democracy’” (DELLA PORTA 2013, 75).\textsuperscript{13} She does not talk about the extent to which each movement deals with issues emerging within its organization through deliberation, because she does not analyze real discussion in movements. Yet her research team has been working on this issue as well. For instance, Dieter Rucht—based

\textsuperscript{12} The 15-M movement in Spain is another case of deliberation within a movement (BLAKELEY 2014; DELLA PORTA 2013, 82–83). Yet Georgina Blakeley also contends that we should not view deliberation as the whole of the 15-M movement because of its engagement with “mobilization and collective action” (BLAKELEY 2014, 30).

\textsuperscript{13} Della Porta emphasizes both deliberation and\textit{ participation}. This view is not exceptional as other deliberative democrats also distinguish between deliberation and deliberative\textit{ democracy}, and in the latter, not only deliberation, but also mass engagement is indispensable (cf. CHAMBERS 2009; WARREN 2002).
on quantitative findings from their research—points out that “deliberation was by far the most common form of interaction in controversies” within social movement groups (Rucht 2013, 63). GJMs are fairly sensitive to issues of power and democracy in their internal communication (Rucht 2013, 67); therefore, they try to “deliberate as much as possible” (Rucht 2013, 66–67). Christoph Haug and Rucht also argue through in-depth participant observation that social movement groups would manage “to deliberate in a reasonable way in a spirit of mutual respect and to reach agreements” (Haug and Rucht 2013, 206). As this research illustrates, GJMs meet and make decisions, some of which are reached in a deliberative and/or participatory manner. This indicates that a social movement itself can be understood as a deliberative system—it is a system in itself, as well as being a part of larger macro system.

THE INTIMATE SPHERE

Understanding the intimate sphere as a site of binding, collective decision-making means to see it in terms of democracy over the intimate sphere. People in the intimate sphere sometimes have to make consensual decisions regarding their everyday lives because even in intimate relationships people are different enough that they need to work together to make decisions. Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim views this situation as the “staging of everyday life”:

More and more coordination is needed to hold together biographies that tend to pull apart from one another. At a number of levels, the family thus becomes a daily “balancing act” or permanent “do-it-yourself” project. The character of everyday family life is gradually changing: people used to be able to rely upon well-functioning rules and models, but now an ever greater number of decisions have to be taken. More and more things must be negotiated, planned, personally brought about. And not least in importance is the way in which questions of resource distribution, of fairness between members of the family, have come to the fore. Which burdens should be allowed to whom? Who should bear which costs? Which claims have priority? Whose wishes have to wait?

(Beck-Gernsheim 1998, 59; notes on references are omitted)

As her argument is based on the ongoing individualization and the emerging “post-familial family,” and as these concepts are controversial, people who do not share her understanding of contemporary society may have some doubts about the validity of her argument. Yet it seems to me that decision-making in the intimate sphere is inevitable even if we do not rely on Beck-Gernsheim’s diagnosis. Accepting the premise that people are
different makes/leads us to recognize the inevitability of conflicts in decision-making among them. As Gerry Stoker writes:

Whether at a “big P” level or “small p” level, politics involves expressing and resolving differences and finding ways of cooperating to achieve actions. (Stoker 2006, 5)

Stoker also argues that:

In other words, politics can provide a means of getting on with your fellow human beings that aims to find a way forward through reconciliation and compromise without recourse to straightforward coercion or outright violence. (Stoker 2006, 7)

Politics is needed because people are different and these differences must be reconciled. We could agree that these kinds of politics are found in the intimate sphere, where we find our “fellow human beings.” Some people may argue that politics is not needed in the intimate sphere because it has something to connect people strongly, such as strong emotional feelings or the “ethics of care.” However, even if such connectedness exists in intimate relationships, it does not mean that politics does not matter.14

Talking about the significance of democracy over the intimate sphere is different from considering its difficulty. The latter is also important, because there are obstacles to deliberation within the intimate sphere that could derive from the inherent nature of the intimate sphere.15 For example, the closedness of the intimate sphere could make the emergence of deliberation and the exchange of reason difficult. Instead, non-deliberative methods and communication with coercion might be used more frequently due to the lack of public scrutiny. A difference in income status and the division of labor among members in the intimate sphere might contribute to asymmetrical communication. While those problems are not necessarily found exclusively in the intimate sphere, there is a high level of likelihood of their occurrence there.

What remains open for discussion is whether the aforementioned argument is really about the idea of deliberative systems. As mentioned previously, Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, 27–29) suppose a deliberative system to have the following seven components: private space, public space, empowered space, transmission, accountability, meta-deliberation, and decisiveness. The focus of this article has been mainly on the empowered space where binding, collective decisions are made, with little atten-

15. See the detailed elaboration in Tamura (2010b, 61–64).
tion to other components. Can we differentiate between public space and private space in the intimate sphere? How can we secure accountability and meta-deliberation in such an informal site? In the following I deal with the problem of public-private distinction.

I argue that the problem of public-private distinction is less important in the intimate sphere than in more “public” spaces like the state for two reasons. First, due to the relatively closed nature of the intimate sphere, the distinction between public and private communication is difficult, although it may still be possible to distinguish the relatively “public” from the relatively “private.” Second, this difficulty does not matter because the most important reason for including the private sphere in the components of a deliberative system is that it reminds us that seemingly “private” matters may also have “public” meanings, and consequently overlook the private sphere might result in the reproduction of inequality and asymmetrical relationships. Hence, when we direct our attention to the intimate sphere in terms of deliberative democratic theory, what is of utmost importance is discovering the possibility of deliberation in the seemingly “private” sphere. If deliberative democracy is to operate in the intimate sphere, it should contribute to overcoming the significant problems existing in it. In contrast, when we talk about a deliberative system as a polity in the usual sense, the conception of the “private sphere” is important because it reminds us of the necessity of paying attention to the intimate sphere, whose role is usually not considered seriously in political science. The distinction between public space and the private sphere becomes less important when we consider deliberative democracy or democracy over the intimate sphere.

NESTED DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS

I have pointed out two aspects of both social movements and the intimate sphere for inclusion when reconsidering grassroots participation in a deliberative democracy. The first is that it is possible, by referring to the recently developed idea of deliberative systems, to regard both social movements and the intimate sphere as sites for a macro-deliberative system, even if their modes of action or communication are non-deliberative. Secondly, we can also consider each social movement and the intimate sphere as a deliberative system by itself because opinions and decisions are produced there. Not only governments at the local, national, or supranational level, but also other sites in a society can make collective decisions over what is presumed to be dealt with at each site.

The concerns raised in this article urge us to rethink the idea of a deliberative system itself. What does this mean? It seems to me that scholars
interested in the idea of deliberative systems have assumed only one deliberative system in a society. When the macro-deliberative effect of micronon-deliberative action is examined, only one macro-deliberative system is presumed and each part of it is considered only in terms of its connection with the macro system. For example, when Dryzek suggests the private sphere, public space, empowered space, accountability, and so on, as components of a deliberative system, it seems to me that he is thinking only of a macro polity such as a liberal democratic national regime or a global system. He refers to the intimate sphere, classrooms, or bars, only as examples of public or private space (Dryzek 2010; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). Yet, as I have shown in this article, those sites should be examined theoretically as “empowered spaces” or “meta-deliberation” sites.

This tendency to understand a deliberative system as a kind of macro system is found in Mansbridge, who originally introduced the idea of deliberative systems in order to argue the significance of (informal) everyday talk in the intimate sphere (Mansbridge 1999). While she goes beyond the existing public/private distinction that is shared in typical political science and theory, it seems to me that her concern is still shackled by the mainstream idea that “authoritative allocation of values” is performed by government at either the national, local, or supranational level. In her own words:

In everyday talk, people both weigh issues and make decisions on them. They decide that their next-door neighbor is wrong in her stance on abortion, that Oprah’s latest guest is right, or that what they themselves thought yesterday did not take some new fact or insight into consideration. When many individuals engage in everyday talk, update their earlier ideas, and coordinate on a new, temporarily settled conviction, the society itself may be said to have “decided,” and a new “authoritative allocation of values” is born. (Mansbridge 2007, 267)

These are important statements because Mansbridge talks about making decisions in everyday life. Everyday talk includes making decisions that contribute to changing existing patterns of “authoritative allocation of value.” However, her focus is still on the macro effect of “decision-making” through everyday talk. In other words, using my own distinction, she is not concerned with democracy over everyday life but democracy from everyday life. Indeed, examining the importance of “societal decisions,” she argues:

Informal discussion can contribute to an eventual state decision and to broad societal decisions, such as the decision not to settle a particular matter through the state. (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 8)
Once again, her suggestion of “societal decisions” is very important when we begin to reconsider the relationship between decision-making and everyday life through which public/private distinction would be reconsidered. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Mansbridge seems to overlook the significance of the everyday talk that would not necessarily be transmitted to the macro system because of her adherence to the existing idea in which collectively binding decisions are supposed to be made at the polity. Political scientists have not considered “decision-making” on a scale confined to everyday life to be significant. Even if “multi-level” or “network” governance is disputed, everyday talk about everyday life does not come into sight. The reason may be that scholars share a presumption that politics is performed in a unit beyond the intimate sphere, even at the local, national, or supranational level. However, if we rethink this presumption, it may become possible to consider decision-making over everyday life as one site of decision-making and, therefore, acknowledge it as a separate deliberative system.

Building upon my argument, I propose the concept of nested deliberative systems. A macro-deliberative system has a nested structure in which each part of the macro-deliberative system has at least two aspects. It should be simultaneously considered not only as a (sometimes perhaps non-deliberative) part of the macro-deliberative system but also as a deliberative system in itself. Hence, social movements and the intimate sphere would also be sites of decision-making. There is no reason to attribute “empowered space” exclusively to governments.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to rethink grassroots participation in deliberative democracy. Nowadays, mini-publics are often referred to as grassroots civic engagement in deliberative democracy. Yet this article argues that in developing the idea of deliberative systems, deliberative democratic theory should profitably be concerned with both social movements and the intimate sphere as other sites of grassroots democracy. Furthermore, this article also argues that it might be useful to reconceptualize deliberative systems as entities with a nested structure. Reconsidering grassroots democracy in terms of this reconceptualized idea of deliberative systems requires reconsidering the role of the government or the state as the only place where binding decision-making is done. Therefore, rethinking grassroots movements in deliberative democracy includes rethinking the questions of what politics is and what the meaning of democracy is.
However, a further question emerges: how can we differentiate the idea of nested deliberative systems from previously developed sociological system theories? It is well-known that Talcott Parsons proposed a theory of social systems with a nested structure (e.g. Parsons and Smelser 1956). Will the idea of nested deliberative systems proposed here still be meaningful after looking at the development of sociological system theory? In considering this issue, careful thought should be given to the problem of functionalism, in particular as Parson’s system theory has been criticized because of it.16

16. Mansbridge and her coauthors recognize this problem of “old style functionalism” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 19). Yet David Owen and Graham Smith point out that their consideration does not go far enough (Owen and Smith 2013, 5–7).
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